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Abstract
By almost any standard, the countries of East Asia have outperformed  other developing
countries over the past three decades. While  there is no "Asian Model"  of development, there
are some common threads that run through the development experiences  of East Asian countries.
These include an outward-looking  strategy, intrusive  but market-oriented government policies,
macroeconomic policies  that encourage savings and investment,  and a  social  consensus for
economic growth.  The positive  experience of  East Asian  countries  has begun to  influence
policymakers  in other developing regions.Why East Asian Economies  Have Been Successful:
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Introduction
The economic performance of East Asian developing  economies over the past
in many other developing countries. The spectacular  rates of growth and the apparent
(to outsiders) ease with which this growth was achieved  have made the region the focus
of intense study by development  economists. Success  has led not surprisingly to
imitation:  policy reforms currently underway in many developing countries are attempting
to  copy the policy successes  of the Asian economies.
By almost any measure,  the recent economic  performance of East Asian
economies has been astounding. Real gross  domestic product in the Newly
Industrializing Economies (NIEs) of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan has
grown between 7% and 10% per year for thirty  years.  Annual per capita growth has
average 6.4%.  In Taiwan, per capita GDP has risen ten-fold since 1960,  and the NIBs as
a group are quickly graduating from the ranks of developing to developed countries!
The resource-rich economies  of the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN)  have turned in lower but still robust growth records over the past several
decades.3 With the exception of the Philippines in the 1980s,  ASEAN average annual
per capita growth rates have been in the 3 to 4 percent rangt~  over the period; their even
stronger performance in the past half-decade  has made them the likely high-growthGangnes  and Naya, Page 2
successors  to the NIBs.
To the planner in Caracas  or Cairo the question is whether and how the economic
success  of East Asia can be reproduced in other places. In particular, are their
government policies that were instrumental in Asian economic success  that might be
usefully copied abroad. What are the lessons  of East Asian success  for other developing
economies?
Elements of Asian Economic Growth
When we go searching  for the secrets  of Asian success,  we should bear in mind
that there is considerable diversity among  the countries that make up the NIEs and
ASEAN.  The countries comprise a wide range of cultures, religions, ethnic groups and
languages,  and they started the development  process  from widely differing initial
conditions.  Among the Nffis,  Hong Kong and Singapore  are small city-states with no
agriculture, while Taiwan and Korea are considerably  larger with populations of 20
million  and 42 million people respectively. Although all the NlEs are highly
industrialized today, agriculture was a very important sector  in Taiwan and Korea in the
1960s. Agriculture  in Korea accounted for 37 percent of GDP in 1960.
The ASEAN countries are also very diverse. They range in population from less
than 20 million  in Malaysia to more than 50 million  in the Philippines and Thailand and
more than 175 million  in Indonesia. Agriculture is an important, though relatively
declining, sector in Indonesia and Thailand.  Indonesia is a petroleum exporter and a
member of OPEC.  Malaysia also exports some oil.Gangnes  and Naya, Page 3
Philippines.  Others were never colonized: Thailand; or never achieved full
independence:  Hong Kong.
Although they are widely different in some  ways,  the countries of East Asia share
some common elements that appear to have been important in their development
success. These common factors are the main focus of this paper.
Exogenous  Factors (Luck)
It is tempting to think that Asia is different, that the Asian "economic miracle" is
the result of a fortuitous  combination of culture, proximity, and timing. The cultural
argument has received considerable  attention.  Many people have argued that
Confucianism, with its emphasis  on hard work, saving,  and education has been
instrumental in the success  of Japan  and the NIEs.  Certainly high savings  rates have
been helpful in supporting rapid domestic expansion  without large external financing,
and widespread education has created a large pool of literat~~  and skilled workers in
these countries.  But these characteristics  are not confined to countries with a Confucian
tradition,  nor have all countries with a Confucian tradition experienced  rapid economic
growth.  In fact, Confucianism has been used to explain the stagnation that existed until
recently in China.  The recent success  of ASEAN countries, which have a variety of
cultural heritages, is evidence against  a strict cultural theory of Asian success.
The close proximity of the high growth countries in A"ia  and the sequentialGangnes  and Naya, Page 4
neighbors.We discuss  this so-called "flying geese"  pattern of development further below.
Although such  factors may have played a role in Asian development, much of
Asian  development success  appears  to flow from less exotic sources, especially  from
enlightened government economic policies.  Governments  of East Asian economies have
adopted domestic policies that promote efficient use of resources  and that encourage
private-sector initiative.  These policies include sound macroeconomic  policies to
stimulate savings  and maintain price stability and market-oriented industrial policies that
encourage competition and efficiency.
Domestic  Resource  Mobilization
An important factor behind rapid growth in East Asian has been the region's high
rates of domestic savings  that have fueled high rates of investment. Like Japan, the
NIEs and ASEAN  countries (with the exception  of the Philippines) have either
dramatically increased or maintained high levels of savings  over the past three decades.4
Korea increased its savings  rate from only 1% in 1960  to 35% today; Singapore dissaved
in 1960, but today saves  more than 40% of GNP.5 These high rates of savings  are due
in part to government policies that encourage  savings,  including measures  to maintain
positive real interest rates.  This extensive  redirection of income from expenditure to
savings  created a large pool of funds for domestic  investmen1:  in infrastructure,Gangnes  and Naya, Page 5
productive capacity and education.
Savings  and capital formation have been encouraged  by the maintenance of
government fiscal and monetary policies conducive  to steady,  non-inflationary growth.
East Asian governments  have placed a premium on fiscal responsibility and low inflation,
and they have been willing  to suffer short-term economic pain to support these goals.
For example, Korea used a self-imposed  austerity program in the 1980s  to keep servicing
requirements on its large foreign debt from overwhelming its current account.  Their
ability to succeed  in this clearly depends  on a fairly high degree of social stability and
public acceptance  of these measures,  an issue  to which we return below.
Outward-Looking Policies
One of the most visible features of developing East Asian economies has been the
importance of export growth in their development. Trade has truly been an engine of
growth in the region.  During the 1970s,  exports grew by 27% in Korea and by more
than 10 percent in the Philippines, Singapore,  and Thailand.  In the 1980s,  when world
trade grew at about 2 percent per year, the NIEs, Malaysia and Thailand saw exports
grow by more than 10 percent per year, and in Indonesian  and the Philippines exports
grew at rates exceeding  6 percent.  As a result, the NIBs' share of world exports rose
from less than 2 percent in 1960  to more than 8 percent by 1988.
The key to the export success  of Asian developing  economies  is their  early
rejection of import  substitution policies in favor of outward-looking policies.  Import
substitution policies were favored by many developing  countries in the early post-warGangnes and Naya, Page 6
because they provide a quick initial  spurt of economic growth as domestic demand rises
barriers protect inefficient domestic industries from foreign competition and prevent
specialization to take advantage  of international gains from trade.  Dependence on
domestic markets alone may lead to inefficiently small scale of plants and inferior
technology.
restrictive import policies appreciate the real exchange  rate and raise domestic
production costs through high prices of imported inputs.
The export-oriented strategy of East Asian developing  economies  allowed them to
exploit their comparative advantage-the production of labor..intensive  export goods.
Specialization in such  goods also meant that labor would share in the proceeds of rapid
growth, as wages  rose with the increasing  marginal product of labor.  Outward
orientation exposed  Asian firms to the "discipline of the market," forcing them to become
efficient in order to compete internationally, and ensuring that they would evolve along
with changing  world demand patterns.
Agricultural Progress
Although we tend to associate  Asian economic success  with manufacturing
prowess, agricultural growth has played an important role in East Asian development
success. Agricultural  production in the NIEs and ASEAN countries increased
substantially in the 1970s  and 1980s  with the introduction of "green revolution"Gangnes and Naya, Page 7
technology and development of markets and infrastructure in these countries, In
addition to improving nutritional  standards,  growth in agriculture aided the growth in
non-farm sectors  of the economies. Agricultural  processing  sectors  benefitted directly.
As farm incomes rose, peasant  farmers increased  demand for the consumer  products of
the emerging manufacturing goods  industries. Foreign exchange  earnings from surging
agricultural exports assisted  the import of capital goods needed by expanding industry.6
Investments  in Human Resources
The rapid industrialization that has occurred in Japan, the NIEs and the ASEAN
countries would not have been possible without substantial growth in the skills,
knowledge, and ability of domestic labor forces. The countries  share  a common
commitment to education, introducing universal primary education, and later secondary,
They have also made substantial teachers'  colleges,  and advanced  universities.
investments in other programs that enhance  human resources,  including health care and
family planning.  In Taiwan, a clinic with family planning, immunizations and basic
health care services  was within walking distance  of every village by 1960. Government
policies to improve nutrition and control population growth have been important in
improving the quality of life and of human capital in these countries.
Successful  Iml2lementation of Growth Policies
We might agree that the policies just described  are conducive to economic growth,Gangnes and Naya, Page 9
eliminating  many of the policies that discriminated against  exports, such as import quotas
and licensing requirements, and they began  providing incentives for industries with
export potential.  Several countries devalued their previously-overvalued  currencies. The
shift toward manufactured exports has been dramatic.  Indonesia has seen  manufactured
exports rise from 7 percent of total exports in 1984  to 25 percent in 1989:  Even in the
Philippines, where reforms have been slower to work, manufactured goods export
earnings rose from 16 percent of total exports to 66 percent between 1975  and 1988.8
Although Japanese  growth was admired by these countries, it was the success  of
Korea and Taiwan that was most influential  in changing  the policy orientation of
ASEAN  governments. Korea and Taiwan had begun their development surge from not
much higher than the typical ASEAN country, so their success  demonstrated that rapid
growth was not an unreachable goal.
The staggered  transition of East Asian economies  to export-oriented development
policies was beneficial in several  ways. The example of successful  Asian neighbors was
clearly influential  in changing government  thinking about development  policy.  The rapid
growth of Japan in early years provided a booming market for the primary product
exports of the other countries.  As Japan  and then the NIEs moved up the industrial
ladder to more capital- and technology-intensive  products, the ASEAN countries were
able to take their place as producers of textiles, clothing, light manufactures,  and recently
high tech "commodities" like  computer components. Japan  provided a ready supply of
capital and technological know-how to support industrialization in other countries in the
region, a role that the NIEs are now beginning to play within ASEAN.  This distinctiveGangnes  and Naya, Page 10
countries, has been called the "flying geese  pattern" of development.
(including Japan) are production, not consumption,  centers; domestic markets in the
region alone would not have been able to sustain  such  rapid export-led growth.  Early
Japan, 
and increasingly  the NIEs, have replaced the U.S. as a primary source of foreign
capital.  Finally, the "security  umbrella" of U.S. military presense  in the region permitted
East Asian countries to minimize military expense  and created a stable environment able
to attract long term capital investment.
Pro-Market Government  InteIVention
The hand of government  is very visible in the workings of East Asian economies,
but its behavior is quite different than in many other developing countries.  Rather than
operating numerous government  enterprises  and tightly controlling the allocation of
factors of production, East Asian governments  have generally  emphasized  market- and
private sector-oriented  policies. This feature  has  become  even  stronger  in recent  years
as the NIEs and increasingly  the ASEAN countries as well have moved further to
implement policies that increase efficiency, including deregulation, enterprise reform, and
privatization.
The Asian countries are far from laissez-faire  economies. Governments in theseGangnes  and Naya, Page 11
such as infrastructure, justice, defence,  and education. They also set industrial objectives
and steered investment activities through a wide range of incentives. This is especially
true in Korea, where the government still maintains a significant amount of control.  But
the thrust of such activities was generally to facilitate private sector activities by
maintaining a relatively open economic environment and "getting prices right," so that
home industries would be competitive on world markets. When industries were
protected during their gestation  period, it was made clear that the protection was to be
temporary, and that the industry would have to become competitive relatively quickly.
Direct participation  in the form of government  enterprise was relatively uncommon.
This strategy of strong government  policy in conjunction with a private sector-oriented
approach has been called "neoclassical  intervention."
The strong pro-market government intervention practiced by East Asian
developing economies  is not without its problems. The strategy of "picking winners" is
fraught with danger.  It may be fairly easy  in the early stages  of development to pick the
winners-textiles,  garments and other light manufactures  are natural choices. but this
gets more difficult  when the sectors  involved are heavy- and high-technology  industries.
It is not easy  to anticipate changes  in comparative advantage  in later stages  of more
capital-and-skill-intensive production, and mistakes can be costly.  Both Korea and
Singapore made major mistakes in the early 1980s  and had to make substantial revisions
in their development plans.
Another  important feature of government  policy in Asian developing countries hasGangnes  and Naya, Page 12
been the consistency  with which its basic thrust has been maintained over years and
circumstances  required. We have noted above that governments in these countries have
been very successful  in maintaining macroeconomic  policies that are conducive to capital
formation and non-inflationary growth.  Political stability in many of these countries has
made this an easier task than in some other developing  regions.  But even countries that
have experienced changes  in governments-Thailand had several  coups during the 1970s
and another last year-have  managed  to keep their basic macro and industrial policies
intact.  This has created a stable, predictable economic environment within which
business can operate effectively.  But governments  have also been flexible when that was
necessary. Countries were willing, for example,  to discard policies that targeted high-
tech development when these plans turned out to have been ill-advised.
A  Social  Consensus  for  Development
Developing countries in East Asia have experienced  relatively little  of the social
conflict that has marred development  efforts in some other regions. The manner in
which development strategies  were designed  and the way that growth proceeded helped
to create a consensus  among government,  business,  intellectuals and the populace in
favor of development reforms. This consensus  made possible a more rapid
implementation of development  policies than would otherwise have been possible.
In some respects,  the limited  social conflict over development  resulted from a
happy historical accident that there was no strong existing ideological opposition toGangnes  and Naya, Page 13
capitalism or western-type industrialization.  Intellectuals and politicians were less
concerned with North-South relations and more concerned  with real economic results.
Economic growth was essentially  a national policy, and the Asian governments used
economic growth to legitimize their regimes.
Business  commitment to development  policy was guaranteed by the close
cooperation between business  and government  in establishing  economic policy. In the
Asian form of capitalism, the government  and business  consult closely with one another.
This is in marked contrast to the adversarial  relationship between government and
business  in the West.  This close cooperation not only helps to ensure that economically-
sound policies are adopted, but also that a constituency  exists that supports (indeed has a
vested interest in) these policies.  Japan  is well known for its close working relationship
between government and business  but this kind of capitalism is not limited  to Japan.  In
Korea, considerable efforts have been made to engage  the industrialists, bankers, and
government officials in deliberations concerning  the selection of appropriate investment
projects.  In Thailand, the Joint Public and Private Sector  Committee, which is chaired
by the Prime Minister, brings together government  officials and businessmen  in an
ongoing policy dialogue.
This cozy relationship between  business  and government  can have drawbacks, of
course. There becomes  a fine line between cooperation and corruption, and
irregularities  such as the Recruit scandal  and the recent Japanese  banking scandal are
likely to arise from time to time.  To avoid such  problems, it is important to create as
transparent relationships as possible and to maintain accountability through bureaucraticGangnes  and Naya, Page 14
or elective  means.
Perhaps most important in forging a social consensus  in Asian developing
countries has been the commitment of the general population to development policies.
Here, the absence  of strong labor unions in most Asian countries made this easier to
achieve.  But the manner in which development  progressed  was equally important.
early success  of labor-intensive light manufacturing industries meant that labor shared
considerably  in the economic gains from the early stages  of industrialization.  At the
same time that average  incomes rose in these countries, income distributions also
became more equitable.  The policy planks that stressed  education and health care also
directly benefitted the masses.
The Limits  to East Asian Growth
Although economic growth in East Asia has been impressive, it has not come
The past few years have shown that there is such a thing as too much without problems.
(or at least too fast) economic growth.  Rapid expansion  has begun to test the limits  of
existing resources-of skilled labor, infrastructure, and the environment.  Real wages  have
risen rapidly, undercutting competitive advantage  in labor-intensive manufactures.
demands for faster wage growth has become  more vocal; Korea has experienced labor
agitation over the wage issue in recent years. The NIBs especially  are being squeezed
from above and below, being forced to provide more income for their citizens while
facing increasingly  competitive products from China and Southeast  Asia.  In many
countries roads and utilities  are overloaded by the demands  of new factories and theirGangnes  and Naya, Page 15
workers.  Deforestation and declining air and water quality are environemental costs. In
coming years, East Asian governments  face the prospect of sharply higher spending on
infrastucture and training, and a reorientation of capital investment toward technically-
sophisticated products, if  they are to continue the steady  improvement in living standards
that they have seen in the past three decades.9
The East Asian economies  are also facing a less hosptiable external environment
Trade friction between  the U.S. and Japan spills over to U.S. trade for their products.
relations with other Asian countries, threatening more restrictive U.S. import markets in
the future.  Because  the U.S. is by far the dominant market for many  Asian exporters,
there is a serious need to prevent further trade deterioration and to seek out new
markets in Europe and Asia!O  New discriminatory trade blocks also threaten to divert
trade away from Asian countries. Countries in the region are particularly concerned
about the possible inclusion of Mexico into the North American Free Trade Area,
fearing that products produced with inexpensive  Mexican labor will  have a competitive
edge in the U.S.
Developing-Count~  Responses  to East Asian Success
The impressive development  record of East Asian countries has not been lost on
the rest of the developing world.  As countries have begun to adjust to the reality of
terms of trade deterioration and have attempted to escape  from under the weight of the
debt crisis, many have adopted economic restructuring programs that incorporate some
of the elements of East Asian experience.Gangnes  and Naya, Page 16
These efforts have already begun to bear fruit.  Nowhere have signs of an
economic turnaround been more evident than in Latin America.  The backdrop for Latin
American reform was fairly grim.  After  substantial  rates of growth in the 1960s,  growth
in Latin America slowed in the 1970s  and fell  even further in the 1980s. For some
countries (Uruguay, Argentina and Bolivia), per capita GDP is now at or near the level
it was in 1960. Only Columbia, Mexico, and Brazil have seen  average per capita GDP
growth above 2% over the last three decades. (Brazil experienced  4% average per
capita growth.)  As a result, levels of per capita income for Latin American countries
have fallen relative to those in East Asia.  Most Latin American countries still have per
capita incomes greater than East Asian countries (except for Hong Kong and Singapore),
but that gap has narrowed considerably.
In the past several  years, economic reform programs in Latin America, especially
in Mexico, Chile, Columbia and Venezuela have begun to turn the tide.  Mexico has
returned to growth in the 4-5 percent range, with investment  growing in the 8-10 percent
range.  Venezuela and Chile have enjoyed similar or higher growth rates in the past two
years. Columbia, still struggling with domestic terrorism, has maintained growth in the 3
to 4 percent range recently.
A  primary element of Latin American reforms has been a renewed emphasis on
market mechanisms. Mexico, for example,  has completed a comprehensive  program of
trade liberalization, financial deregulation and privatization.  Other countries have
followed suit, reducing tariff  walls, renegotiating with developed country banks and the
IMF  to reduce still  heavy debt burdens, and reducing budget deficits to get their fiscalGangnes  and Naya, Page 17
houses in order.  Inflation rates are at manageable  levels of 20-30 percent in Mexico,
Chile, Columbia and Venezuela, although they are still in the hundreds of percent in
Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Uruguay.  A consensus  for reform seems  to have emerged in
Latin America.  An Economist  magazine  article summarizes  the mood:
"Avoid fiscal deficits and restrain monetary growth.  Keep the exchange  rate
realistic and liberalize currency controls.  Cut import tariffs to 20% or less, to
keep local producers competitive and push them to seek  markets abroad.  Abolish
those easy-to-collect  taxes on exports. Keep real interest rates positive.  And
privatize.  The buzzwords  are sustained,  non-inflationary, export-led growth."U
The financial markets have responded  favorably to these reforms.  Latin
American stock markets are booming, fueled in part by aretum  of domestic capital that
had fled abroad.  The privatized Mexican telephone company  is one of the most actively-
traded stocks on the New York  stock exchange.The value of Latin American debt in
secondary  markets, which had traded at steep  discounts  less than two years ago, has risen
by about 20-30% of face value since then.
These reforms have not come painlessly,  of course. The sharp cuts in government
spending  have reduced expenditure on basic services  like water, sewers,  schools and
hospitals.  Unemployment has grown in most countries, and the number of people below
the poverty line has increased. So far, however,  no political  firestorm has developed.
Presidents in Mexico and Argentina were reelected in spite of economic hardships.
Nevertheless,  the governments  in Latin America face a serious tradeoff between the pace
of reform and social unrest.
Lessons  for E~t  (an Outsider's View)Gangnes  and N  aya, Page 18
In  many  ways,  to the outsider Egypt looks like the archetypal developing country
of the 1990s. It has lived through a period of reliance on import-substituting
development policies, and now maintains a large government  sector, centrally-controlled
production and allocation, and an export sector dependent on oil and the Suez  canal.
The burden of high levels of government spending  has led Egypt to accumulate a heavy
load of international debt, and to resort in part to seigniorage  with its associated
inflation.  Like  other developing countries, it is trying to implement market-based
reforms, but progress  is impeded by entrenched  bureaucracy  and fear of social unrest.  A
brief  look at the Egyptian situation suggests  the benefits from pushing forward with such
reforms, as well as the difficulty in doing so.
The legacy of import-substitution in Egypt is certainly familiar to  many of this
audience.  Development in Egypt has traditionally been heavily managed from the center
to promote import-substituting production.  As a result the country has a massive  public
sector.  In recent years, government  expenditures  have constituted nearly half of GDP.
Many non-government industries are heavily subsidized  either through direct subsidies,
or, more importantly,  through implicit subsidies  from price controls. The most important
of these are regulated energy and food prices. These subsidies  and the large government
payroll have necessitated  heavy foreign borrowing (when that was available) and more
recently increased printing of money.  Inflation, meager  net savings,  and heavy resource
transfers abroad have been the result.  The extensive  system  of implicit  and explicit
subsidies  contributes to microeconomic price distortions that are "internationally
notoriouS.fll2 The resulting pattern of financial rates of return has almost noGangnes  and Naya, Page 19
relationship to estimates of the true economic rates of return.13
In the past several  years, the government  of Egypt has made efforts to reduce the
macro and micro distortions created by large and intrusive government, Real interest
rates, which had been negative, have been made more realistic, reducing the
disincentives to save. The government  hopes  to stabilize its budget deficit at a
"manageable" 10% of GDP through a new sales  tax and paring down of direct subsidies
and reduction of public sector  real wages. Much of the remaining government deficit is
now financed by debt rather than bank loans, reducing inflationary pressure.14  Price
increases  for fuel, electricity and communications  have been pushed through.  By being
on the "right side" in the Gulf War, Egypt has received forgiveness  or favorable
rescheduling on $25 billion in foreign debt.  The government may  be on the way to
establishing a more stable macroeconomic  environment, and one conducive to capital
formation.
The heavy control of industry prices remains a severe  obstacle to a more efficient
economy. A  successful  shift to export-led growth would require elimination of price
controls that discriminate against  goods for which Egypt pote.ntially  has a comparative
The current system  has advantage in favor of others for which it  clearly does not.
reduced cotton exports to a small fraction of their 1970s  levels and has increased Egypt's
dependence on expensive  imported food.  Meanwhile production of capital-intensive
goods, such as aluminum, has expanded. This costly scheme  not only fails to create
competitive goods for the world market, but increases  unemployment by displacing
workers from labor-intensive sectors.  IS Prices of inputs-energy, agricultural products,Gangnes  and Naya, Page 20
capital-must  be restored to market levels before incentives for efficient production will
exist.
The overwhelming size of the public sector in Egypt will  make the transition to
market-oriented industry more difficult.  An increased  role for the private sector will
require substantial dislocation of public-sector  employees. For this reason, the
government appears to be moving conservative  toward more decentralization of decision
making within the public sector rather than extensive  outright privatization.16 It seems
doubtful  that this will  radically improve the efficiency of state enterprises. Bureaucratic
rigidity and infighting also make wholesale change  more difficult to implement.
In the case  of the East Asian countries, supporting the development efforts was a
consensus  on the part of government,  business,  intellectuals and the citizenry that the
development program was desirable.  It may be difficult to forge such  a consensus  in
Egypt.  The anti-imperialist and socialist traditions in Egypt shape  thinking  in
government: "There is so little  agreement  within Egypt on the appropriate economic and
social path the country should be following-whether  socialist, capitalist, or Islamic-that
various voices within individual ministries compete for President Mubarak's attention."17
There are also a large number of businesses  with vested interests in the status quo.
Getting the populous on board will  also be difficult. The social cost of reform is
potentially very great.  Reduction of food subsidies  or basic social services  from a
growing, impoverished population will be painful.  The government remembers well the
1977  bread riots in which 100  people died, and is wary of opportunism by Islamic
fundamentalists.The government  of Egypt needs  to facilitate quick and visibleGangnes  and Naya, Page  21
relocations of workers to the new growth industries, whatever they may be, in  order to
demonstrate the gains  to the general  public from market-based  reforms.
Conclusions
By any reasonable standard,  the NIBs have outperformed all other developing
countries in the past three decades. The ASEAN countries have also been relatively
successful. While exogenous  factors such  as initial  conditions, location, and culture may
The common have played a part in this success,  they were not of primary importance.
element in each of these success  stories appears  to be consistently-applied,  sound
Asian developing  countries have embraced outward-looking economic policies.
development strategies that promote industrial competitiveness  within a conservative,
non-inflationary macroeconomic environment conducive  to savings  and investment.
These countries have emphasized  social programs-education, training, health care-that
raise the quality of human resources  and that help generate a social consensus  for
economic growth.
The experience of these countries suggests  some general principles that may guide
policy design.  Government policies can be implemented more effectively and with less
distorting effects by using indirect controls that work through the price mechanism rather
than direct controls.  Fiscal and monetary restraint that encourages  stable prices and
exchange  rates is important for maintaining a healthy environment for saving  and
investment and for protecting price competitiveness  of the country's goods. Trade,
financial, industrial and labor policies all contribute to these goals.Gangnes  and Naya, Page 22
been used. Taiwan, for example,  emphasized  competition within the domestic economy,
and its economy has many small firms and no extremely  large ones. Korea, however,
liberal  financial policies.  Indonesia, for example,  liberalized capital flows at a much
approach that seeks out what works best in any specific country.
Aside from uncertainties about the timetable and sequencing  of reforms, there are
roadblocks along the way to outward-looking, market-oriented reform.  First, a reduction
of import protection and removal of subsidies  to public enterprises  will  lead to
bankruptcies, and unemployment  will rise in some sectors. This can generate intense
political  opposition to liberalization and privatization.  The reform package must include
policies to speed the reallocation of resources  toward export sectors.
Second,  a depreciation of the exchange  rate and trade liberalization  may lead to
balance of payments problems.  Because  of likely short-run J-curve effects,  imports  may
increase faster than exports initially, and programs to accelerate export response  wouldGangnes  and Naya, Page 23
Third,  inflation  may tend to rise under devaluation, reducing the favorable effects
on competitiveness. The uncertainty associated  with inflation will  also reduce the
incentives for savings  and investment. Maintaining reforms at all becomes difficult  if
inflation gets out of hand.  Therefore, anti-inflationary stabilization policies must be
adopted in conjunction with the liberalizations.
Fourth, favorable external conditions are important for a successful  shift to
outward-looking growth policies.  There has recently been some concern that the world
trade environment is not big enough  to accommodate  the increasing number of
developing countries that are turning to outward-looking policies.  This "new export
pessimism"  is based on concerns  that developed country markets could become flooded
with goods from developing country exporters. But the world export market is not fixed.
Increased trade liberalization should create new opportunities for gains from trade for all
countries.  And  from the standpoint of an individual country, it is always  possible to take
over the market share of other countries by becoming  more competitive.  Finally,
comparative advantage  is a dynamic process. As Japan developed,  rising wages  in Japan
meant its advantage in labor-intensive manufactures  was lost to the NIEs.  Japan moved
on to technology-intensive  goods. Similarly, the NIBs are now seeing their comparative
advantage in labor-intensive goods  eroded by competition from ASEAN countries.
This discussion,  however, does point out the strong interest that developing
countries have in maintaining an open world trade environment.  Developing countries
may stand to lose the most if the world trading system  deteriorates into a set of "FortressGangnes  and Naya, Page 24
Europes" and "Fortress North Americas."  Developing countries should be strong
advocates  for multilateral  free trade, and they should be willing to demonstrate their
commitment by making concessions  of their own at the bargaining table.Gangnes  and Naya, Page 25
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